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Abstract
Given a game admitting an exact potential, affine transformations of utilities are described
that do or do not destroy the property. All weighted potentials of a game admitting one are
described.
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Monderer and Shapley (1996a) developed their notion of a potential game in both car-
dinal and ordinal versions. Most attention was paid to the former; more precisely, to
exact potentials. However, an obvious objection can be raised against that very notion:
a von Neumann{Morgenstern utility is de¯ned up to a strictly increasing a±ne transfor-
mation, and such transformations can easily destroy (or create) an exact potential.
Apparently aware of this objection, Monderer and Shapley also de¯ned a weighted
potential, which is indeed an attribute of a game with NM utilities (the observation was
explicit in Morris and Ui, 2004). Actually, all interesting results on mixed extensions of
potential games (Sela, 1992; Monderer and Shapley, 1996b; Huang, 2002; Morris and Ui,
2004) require the presence of a weighted potential.
This note investigates the relationship between cardinal potentials and a±ne trans-
formations of utilities. Proposition 5 establishes an additive structure of exact potentials,
which helps describe transformations that do or do not destroy the presence of such po-
tentials (Theorem 1). Similar considerations help us describe all weighted potentials of a
game (Theorem 2). The point is Monderer and Shapley showed that two exact potentials
of the same game di®er in a constant. A weighted potential obviously survives a strictly
increasing a±ne transformation, but it would be generally wrong to assert that only such
transformations are allowed.
The next section contains basic de¯nitions and auxiliary results. The additive struc-
ture of exact potentials is introduced in Section 3. The main results are in Section 4.
2 Basic notions
A strategic game ¡ is de¯ned by a ¯nite set of players N (we denote n = #N), and
strategy sets Xi and utility functions ui: XN ! R for all i 2 N, where XN =
Q
i2N Xi is
the set of strategy pro¯les. For each I µ N, we denote XI =
Q
i2I Xi; instead of XNnfig
and XNnI, we write X¡i and X¡I, respectively. Given I µ N and xI 2 XI, we de¯ne a
reduced game ¡(xI) with N n I as the set of players, the same strategy sets and utilities
u0
i(x¡I) = ui(x¡I;xI) for every i 2 N n I and x¡I 2 X¡I.
A strategic game ¡0 is NM-equivalent to ¡ if N0 = N and X0
i = Xi for each i 2 N,
whereas for each i 2 N there is a strictly increasing a±ne transformation, ¸i(v) = aiv+bi
(ai > 0), such that
u
0
i(xN) = ¸i ± ui(xN)
for every xN 2 XN.
Monderer and Shapley (1996a) de¯ned an exact potential of a game ¡ as a function
P : XN ! R such that
ui(yN) ¡ ui(xN) = P(yN) ¡ P(xN) (1)
1whenever i 2 N, yN;xN 2 XN, and y¡i = x¡i. A weighted potential of ¡ is a function
P : XN ! R satisfying
8i 2 N 9wi > 08yN;xN 2 XN
£






Clearly, (2) is invariant under strictly increasing a±ne transformations of utility functions,
which cannot be said about (1).
Proposition 1 (Voorneveld et al., 1999). A function P : XN ! R is an exact potential
of ¡ if and only if for every i 2 N there is a function Qi: X¡i ! R such that
ui(xN) = P(xN) + Qi(x¡i)
for every xN 2 XN.
Proposition 2 (Monderer and Shapley, 1996a). Let P be an exact potential of a
game ¡. Then a function P 0: XN ! R is an exact potential of ¡ if and only if there is
C 2 R such that P 0(xN) = P(xN) + C for all xN 2 XN.
Proposition 3 (Monderer and Shapley, 1996a). A game ¡ admits an exact potential
if and only if for every i;j 2 N (i 6= j), x0
i;x00
i 2 Xi, x0
j;x00



































j;x¡ij) = 0: (3)
Proposition 4 (Morris and Ui, 2004). Let ¡ be a game and P be a function XN ! R.
Then P is an exact potential of a game NM-equivalent to ¡ if and only if P is a weighted
potential of ¡.
Proof. Indeed, if P satis¯es (2), then it satis¯es (1) for u0
i = (1=wi) ¢ ui. Conversely, if P
satis¯es (1) for u0
i = ai ¢ ui + bi, then it satis¯es (2) with wi = 1=ai.
3 Additive structure
Given a game ¡, we de¯ne two binary relations on the set N. First, we say that j
in°uences i, and denote the fact j ° i, if i = j or there are x0
i;x00
i 2 Xi, x0
j;x00
j 2 Xj, and


















Second, we set j » = i if and only if there are i0;i1;:::;im 2 N such that i0 = i, im = j, and,
for each k, either ik+1 ° ik or ik ° ik+1 (i.e., » = is the symmetric and transitive closure of
°). Clearly, » = is an equivalence relation, hence N is partitioned into equivalence classes;
2we denote N the set of the classes. Whenever I 2 N, i 2 I63 j, x0
i;x00
i 2 Xi, x0
j;x00
j 2 Xj,


















It is important for the following to note that both ° and » = are invariant under strictly
increasing a±ne transformations of utilities, i.e., both relations and the partition N are
the same in NM-equivalent games.
When ¡ admits an exact potential, (3) and (4) together imply that the relation ° is
symmetric. In particular, if ui = const (player i is a dummy), then fig 2 N.
Proposition 5. Let P be an exact potential of a game ¡; then for each I 2 N there is a




PI(xI) for all xN 2 XN: (6)
If there is also a list of functions P 0
I : XI ! R, I 2 N, such that (6) holds when PI
are replaced with P 0
I, then there are constants CI 2 R such that
P
I2N CI = 0, and
P 0
I(xI) = PI(xI) + CI for all I 2 N and xI 2 XI.
Proof. Let I 2 N and #I = m. We ¯x one-to-one mappings ¾: f1;:::;mg ! I and
¾0: f1;:::;n ¡ mg ! N n I. Combining (1) and (5) for i = ¾(k) (k = 1;:::;m) and











































































































































I 2 XI and x00
¡I;x0
¡I 2 X¡I. Fixing x0












Now for every i 2 I 2 N and yN;xN 2 XN such that x¡i = y¡i (hence x¡I = y¡I) we
have ui(yN) ¡ ui(xN) = P(yN) ¡ P(xN) = P(yI;x0
¡I) ¡ P(xI;x0
¡I) = PI(yI) ¡ PI(xI) =
Q(yN)¡Q(xN), the ¯rst equality following from (1), the second from (7), the last two from
(8). Therefore, Q is an exact potential of ¡; by Proposition 2, Q(xN) ¡ P(xN) = const.
Since Q(x0
N) = P(x0
N), we have Q(xN) = P(xN) for all xN 2 XN.
To prove the second statement, we notice that if P is an exact potential of ¡ and
(6) is valid, then each PI is an exact potential of the reduced game ¡(x0
¡I) (regardless of
the choice of x0





¡I) = PI(yI) ¡ PI(xI). Therefore, P 0
I(xI) ¡ PI(xI) =
const by Proposition 2 applied to ¡(x0
¡I).
4 Main results
Theorem 1. Let ¡ be a game admitting an exact potential P, and ¡0 be a game NM-equiv-
alent to ¡ (with strictly increasing a±ne transformations ¸i(v) = aiv + bi, i 2 N ). Then
¡0 admits an exact potential if and only if ai = aj whenever j » = i. If the condition is
satis¯ed, then P 0(xN) =
P
I2N aI ¢ PI(xI) is an exact potential of ¡0 whenever (6) holds
(aI, naturally, denotes the common value of ai for i 2 I).
Proof. If the condition on ¸i's is satis¯ed and a representation (6) is given, we de¯ne
P 0(xN) =
P











= P 0(yN) ¡ P 0(xN),
i.e., P 0 is an exact potential of ¡0.
Let the condition be violated: there are i0;i00 2 N such that i0 » = i00, but ai0 6= ai00. By
the de¯nition of » =, there are i;j 2 N, x0
i;x00
i 2 Xi, x0
j;x00
j 2 Xj, and x¡ij 2 X¡fi;jg such



































which is not 0 by (4). Multiplying ui by ai and uj by aj, and taking into account that
ai 6= aj, we immediately see that (3) is violated for u0
i and u0
j. By Proposition 3, ¡0 cannot
admit an exact potential.
4Proposition 6. For every game ¡, the following statements are equivalent.
1. Every game NM-equivalent to ¡ admits an exact potential.
2. Each I 2 N is a singleton.
3. For each i 2 N, there are functions Pi: Xi ! R and Qi: X¡i ! R such that
ui(xN) = Pi(xi) + Qi(x¡i) for every xN 2 XN.
Proof. The equivalence Statement 1 () Statement 2 immediately follows from Theo-
rem 1. If Statement 3 holds, then we obtain Statement 1 by the su±ciency part of Propo-
sition 1. Finally, if Statement 2 holds, then there is an exact potential by Statement 1,
hence Proposition 5 and the necessity part of Proposition 1 imply Statement 3.
Theorem 2. Let P be a weighted potential of a game ¡, and P 0 be a function XN ! R.
Then the following statements are equivalent.
1. P 0 is a weighted potential of ¡.
2. There is a representation (6) and a strictly increasing a±ne transformation ¸I : R !





¸I ± PI(xI) for all xN 2 XN: (9)
3. For every representation (6), there are strictly increasing a±ne transformations
¸I : R ! R (I 2 N) such that (9) holds.
Proof. By Proposition 4, we may assume that P is an exact potential of ¡.
Let Statement 1 hold; by Proposition 4, P 0 is an exact potential of a game ¡0 NM-equiv-
alent to ¡. Given a representation (6), we apply Theorem 1, obtaining that ai = aj when-
ever j » = i. The second statement of Theorem 1 implies that P 00(xN) =
P
I2N aI ¢ PI(xI)
is also an exact potential of ¡0. By Proposition 2, there is C 2 R such that P 0(xN) =
P 00(xN)+C for all xN 2 XN. Picking a list of hbIiI2N such that
P
I2N bI = C and de¯ning
¸I(v) = aI ¢ v + bI, we obviously obtain (9). Therefore, Statement 3 holds.
If Statement 2 holds, then the second statement of Theorem 1 immediately implies
that P 0 is an exact potential of a game NM-equivalent to ¡, hence is a weighted potential
of ¡ by Proposition 4.
Corollary. Let ¡ be a game in which N is a singleton, P be a weighted potential of
¡, and P 0 be a function XN ! R. Then P 0 is a weighted potential of ¡ if and only if
there is a strictly increasing a±ne transformation ¸ such that P 0(xN) = ¸±P(xN) for all
xN 2 XN.
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